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Chapter One: Approach and Pre-History 
 
The study of foreign policy was traditionally a study of how different agents vied with one 
another in order to secure specific outcomes. This is not such a study. The point here is to say 
something about the aggregated social and historical context within which the clash between 
different positions happens. The object of study is the clash of reality claims that result in 
identities. I focus on discursive work – how different agents draw on available representations of 
particular phenomena such as ‘Europe’, but also ‘Russia’, ‘the West’ etc., to define not only 
those phenomena, but also, and in extension thereof, the specific foreign policy processes that 
shape outcomes. This mapping of how different representations vie with one another to define a 
specific phenomenon is of interest in itself, but the ultimate point of the exercise is to say 
something about what makes it possible to add to a specific representation of Europe by saying, 
for example, ‘Europe is a model for us in terms of oil extraction’ or ‘Europe is rotten’. Put more 
technically, I study utterances or statements by Russians in order to understand what makes it 
possible to have such statements accepted as truth claims. I call these representations. What 
makes it possible to make statements at all, that is, the system for the formulation of statements, 
is discourse. (Dunn and Neumann, 2016). The Russian debate about Europe is a clash of 
representations. When representations are materialised – that is, when they and their bearers are 
streamlined and organised by bringing institutional resources to bear, I talk about a position. For 
example, when the Russian state proclaimed an Official Nationalism in 1825, a specific 
representation of Europe was made into the state’s position. Specific heed has to be paid to the 
state’s position, for in the period studied here, the state was the key institution in bringing 
resoucres to bear on representations, and so a major force in the debate. 
 
This way of studying foreign policy as a boundary-producing identity practice was trail-blazed 
by scholars of International Relations such as Richard Ashley (1987a), David Campbell (1992) 
and Ole Waever (2002). Their sources of inspiration included post-colonial literature, especially 
Edward Said’s 1978 book Orientalism. The basic idea in that book is that 'the East' is a so-called 
constitutive outside for 'the West', which means that the East is the Other from which the West 
has to delimit or limn its identity. Said placed the terrain on which this happens not in the 
psychic system, where many previous scholars had placed it, but in the social system. It is the 
social representations of the Other, and not the mental constructs thereof, which are of the 
essence. This had the immediate methodological effect that textual and visual presentations 
become the place to look for the emergence of the Other. Behind Said stood the French post-
structuralists, particularly Michel Foucualt, who argued that knowledge – which is the overall 
object of study for all the people mentioned here – is inextricably tied to power. 
Power/knowledge is a single entity. Knowledge, as a representational system, is about producing 
social reality. This means that representation is productive, which means that it has social 
effects. Where this book is concerned, the key point is that Russian knowledge produced about 
what Europe ‘is’, has immediate effects on what the Russian state does. To put the point 
differently, the Russian discourse on Europe is a precondition for Russian foreign policy (but it 
is not, of course, a fully determining condition; Hansen, 2006). As such, it is also the study of 
how a structural precondition – Russia’s place in the states system – becomes a tangible 
precondition for decision making. A social analysis of foreign policy cannot assume that 
structure has a direct impact on action. It is not structure understood analytically, but structure as 
represented by foreign policy makers, that preconditions a state’s foreign policy.  
 
Knowledge production is a wide phenomenon. The knowledge production discussed here, about 
how to limn off Russia from Europe, overlaps with another knowledge-producing discourse, the 
one on how Russians should organise themselves politically. Perhaps the most innovative work 
on Russian foreign policy that has come out since the first edition of this book is Ted Hopf’s 
work on how everyday Russian practices constrain the possibility for new political projects, and 
particularly liberal political projects such as the building of a Rechtsstaat and other democratic 
institutions (Hopf, 2002, 2013). In Russia itself, discourse on how Russia should be organised 
politically has, for reasons discussed throughout the book, rather come to be dominated by the 
idea that the boundaries of the Russian cultural area should coincide with the boundaries of the 
Russian political unit. This is the doctrine of nationalism. From it flows the idea that the Russia 
state has a special responcibility not only for Russians living abroad, but also for people who the 
Russian state itself define as something called ‘the Russian world’ and which increasingly seems 
to include everyone who was once a part of Russian-dominated Soviet Union or descendant of 
same, whether they themselves think so or not (see Kazharski, forthcoming). The delineation of 
Russia from Europe under discussion here, then, is not only a question that has abstract 
repercussions on foreign policy. Since Russian discourse sees Russia as sharing a boundary with 
‘Europe’ to its West, the question of what falls where also has a territorial component. I will 
touch on this question throughout, so suffice to say for now that this study, which focusses on 
how Russians delineate their nation and their state, is therefore also necessarily a study of 
Russian nationalism. 
 
As Said would have been the first to point out, Russia is not alone in delineating itself in relation 
to ‘Europe’ and ‘the West’. So does Turkey and its predecessors (Wigen, 2016), and so, 
arguably, do polities that have no direct territorial boundary with Europe, such Iran, China and 
Japan. The reason for this is obvious. By dint of the colonialism of the 18th and 19th centuries 
and beyond, the structural force of European models impinged not only on Russia, but on the 
entire world. In postcolonial studies, the ensuing challenge to non-European thinking about 
politics and international relations is known as Chakrabarty's (2000) problem: should non-
European thinkers think political developments in terms of the incoming European models, or 
should they stick to local models? Since Russia is the polity that has had the longest direct 
exposure to this problem, the history of the Russian discourse on Europe is longer than the 
others, but that should not keep us from seeing the striking parallels between them all (for China, 
see Zhang, 1991; for Greece, see Stivachtis, 1998; for Japan, see Suzuki, 2005; for Turkey, see 
Wigen, 2016; for nine East European and Balkan states, see Ejdus, 2016; for Iran, see Shams-
Lahijani, forthcoming; see also Sharp, 2003). In this sense, the present study has a place in the 
burgeoning literature on post-colonialism (Prozorov, 2006; Morozov, 2015), where the primary 
object of study is exactly knowledge production from a dominated or subaltern position, of the 
kind that is on display throughout this book. 
 
Debate about Europe is a traditional staple of Russian intellectual life (Berlin, 1963). Indeed, the 
idea of Europe is the main 'Other' in relation to which the idea of Russia is defined. This book 
demonstrates how Russians, when they make out to discuss Europe, also discuss themselves. 
Like other identities, the Russian one does not reside in essential and readily identifiable cultural 
traits but in relations, and the question of where and how borders towards 'the Other' should be 
drawn therefore becomes crucial (Neumann, 1994b).  
 
The role of external 'Others' for the identity formation of nations and states reveals the relevance 
of these processes for the student of international relations. The making of Russian policy is 
dependent on what sort of political project its politically leading citizens want Russia to be. 
Since the fight about this is conducted as a question of how it should relate to Europe, ideas 
about Europe emerge as a key background determinant for both domestic and foreign policy.[1] 
 
The last two decades decade have seen this debate heating up once again. After the fall of the 
Soviet Union and the intense westernisation wave 1991-1993, there was a backlash, and the 
questions of to what extent and at what speed the market, the multiparty system and other 
creations of European history should be adopted in Russia, was the overriding issue of the day. 
When Vladimir Putin returned to Presidential office in 2012, however, this debate was rapidly 
curtailed in favour of an ever more hard-line nationalist position. The state is privileged 
participant in the Russian debate about Europe, for it can manipulate a number of its 
preconditions. And yet, its room for manoeuvre is circumscribed by the historical stock of 
Russian thinking about Europe, as well as by the character of and relative strength of the 
different representations of Europe that exist in the overall debate. This book is an attempt at 
charting the history of debate by looking at it holistically. It tells the story of how 'multiple alien 
interpretations' of Europe 'struggle, clash, deconstruct, and displace one another' (Ashley, 1987b: 
409-410; Foucault, 1977: 156; Der Derian, 1987: 69-70). 'Europe' is seen as a speech act; it is 
talked and written into existence. Russian interests in 'Europe' are not postulated as one given 
'national interest', but are investigated where they are formulated, namely in discourse. 
Following Tzvetan Todorov ([1982], 1991), three questions are asked of each text: What is the 
framework within which the European Other is seen? What moral judgement is made of the 
Other? What relationship is proposed between Russia and the European Other? The inquiry is 
                                                 
    [1] Vincent (1980: 259) identifies one of the dangers of treating one state's domestic debate about 
international relations in isolation from its participation in the international debate when he warns that a 
reading of domestic texts might 'give a harsher view of the clash of cultures in world politics than is 
justified by the reality of their mutual recognition.' This is a timely warning against inferring too much 
about Russian foreign policy solely from an undertaking of this kind, and not against the kind of 
undertaking as such (also Hollis & Smith, 1991b). For an overview of Russian foreign policy towards 
Europe, see Forsberg and Haukkala (2016). 
limited to written primary material. The focus is on the debate as such, with its constituting 
elements and permitted scope, rather than what for the sake of contrast could perhaps be called 
its 'vessels' - particular individuals, particular movements, particular texts, particular journals 
and publishing houses. The preoccupation is not with Russian participation in a debate crossing 
borders, but is, on the contrary, confined to Russian debates conducted in Russian, directed at 
Russians, concerning Europe and, by the same token, the Russians themselves.  
 
Until the latter half of the nineteenth century, the concept used for Europe in Russian debates 
was zapad – literally west or the West. Europe was also used. As the United States came to the 
fore in international relations, zapad became an even more geographically indeterminate concept 
than before, since it could refer either to Europe only, or to Europe and its former settler 
colonies, with the United States taking pride of place amongst them. It is a limitation of this 
study, particularly where the period from the Second World War and until today is concerned, 
that this problem is not confronted head-on, but has been left to be tackled by future studies.[2] 
 
The problem of which texts to use as source material was not an easy one to tackle. As noted 
above, although in principle finite, the number of Russian texts about Europe is for practical 
purposes endless. That in itself is no problem, since I am only looking for the major constitutive 
elements of the debate which exist at any given time. Elements can be considered major if they 
are new - not having previously appeared in print - since any new element, even one appearing 
at the extreme margin of the debate, may at some later stage move towards its centre. Although 
not necessarily of any immediate great significance, they have a major potential. Similarly, an 
element is major if it is already occupying a central place and is thus part of a frame of reference 
which is widely shared. If one concentrates on books, journals and newspapers which have been 
                                                 
[2] One place to start would be English, 2000. 
widely reacted to in print, it is likely that one can deduce these elements of novelty and 
centrality. In this sense, there is such a thing as reading enough. 
 
Where the new elements are concerned, however, one may miss those which never occupied 
centre stage in the debate. I have no guarantee that I have not overlooked some of these. To the 
contrary, it is likely that some such elements have indeed slipped through my fingers. In his 
work on literary genres, the semiotician Yuriy Lotman (1990) draws attention to how it is 
always possible to find distant precursors for a 'new' genre once it is firmly embedded at the 
centre of the debate. The reason he gives for this is that elements which are too different from 
the predominant texts when they are introduced, tend to be overlooked by contemporary readers. 
Ideas may simply be too new and different, quite literally so 'far out' of the ongoing debate that 
they are not even noticed, or mistaken for something else, or taken to be so incomprehensible as 
to be worthless. If this is so, it suggests that debates can only evolve gradually, that quantum 
leaps are only discovered with hindsight. And if so, then discursive moves need not be deep, 
profound or even wholly original to have an impact; to the contrary, depending on the speed 
with which the debate moves, they may stand a better chance of having an impact if they are not 
too outré.  
 
Discursive elements come in packages, such as the (unusually sharply defined) Bolshevik 
package. I will use the more deferential word 'position' to denote such packages. In imposing 
such classification on the debate, I have elaborated on the system of classification used within 
the debate itself. Positions vary as to the number and disparity of their constitutive elements. 
Similarly, the number of positions making up the entire debate is, as a matter of principle, in 
eternal flux. Yet one position is a fixture, because it is not, like the others, forwarded by 
volunteers. This is the position of the state. The state arrogates to itself the fixation of the limits 
of public debate, and can bring a range of power resources to bear on the debate itself, from 
censorship of texts and publication channels through bestowing of positive and negative 
incentives onto other participants to physical extinction. The state's power to define the limits of 
public political space warrants particularly close scrutiny of its role in the debate. The state does 
not in any way stand as it were 'above' the debate; nor does it provide the matrix on which that 
debate will necessarily take place. Yet, by allowing certain positions and crowding out others, 
and by moving its own position between them, it does seem to aspire not only to defining the 
limits of the debate, but also to defining and occupying its centre. That is to say, it attempts to 
define the limits of the debate in such a way that its own position takes up the centre. In the 
1930s, the aspirations of the Russian state even went beyond this and towards setting up shop as 
the political equivalent of the astronomer's black hole, sucking all other political life into itself 
and making it disappear from public view. Yet, such a collapse of all positions into one single 
'general will', that is, the end of debate, can hardly take place. Not only all positions, but all texts 
carry within themselves internal contradictions which will, even without the intervention of 
other debates, in and of themselves generate new debate (Foucault, 1974: 151). Similarly, a 
history of the present can have no unquestioned beginning. The main period under discussion is 
the last two hundred years. The periodization stems from the double revolution which took place 
in Western Europe at the end of the eighteenth century. The French Revolution ushered in new 
ideas about the state and citizenship, and the industrial revolution opened up new ways for man 
to dominate both his environment and his fellow human beings. At the same time, philosophers 
conversing in German initiated a new debate concerning man, society and the state. The political 
categories which congealed at this time were to play an important role in European debate for 
years to come. It was also the time when Russia, due to its military potential, became a fully 
fledged Great Power within the European-based state system. For all of these reasons, I take the 
Napoleonic Wars as the starting point for my investigation of the Russian debate about 
Europe.[3] 
 
However, since the coming to power of Ivan the terrible or Peter the Great could well have been 
substituted for the Napoleonic Wars as a starting point, the rest of this introduction will be taken 
up by a short 'prehistory'. In a highly influential book, Florin Curta (2001) places the 
transformation of largely Slavic tribes into kingdoms on the Danube in the sixth century, and 
writes it down to the transforming power of Byzantium. It was Byzantium that furnished the 
new models that turned Slavic tribal farmers into founders of sedentary polities. He ends the 
book by noting that the same process was in evidence further north some half a millennium later. 
East Slavic and other tribes, such as the Finno-Ugric Meria, had been turned into a chiefdom by 
incoming Varangians from the West from the ninth century onwards. We know little about this 
polity, which has become known to posterity as the Rus’ Khaganate (Golden, 2001). We do 
know, however, that from it sprang a state known as Kievan Rus’, and we do know that it was 
its relationship with Byzantium that brought on the transformation from Khaganate to state. 
Whereas the first Slavic kingdoms came about as a result of the meeting with Byzantium on the 
Danube, the first Rus’ state came about as Varangian-led Slavs met Byzantium around the Black 
Sea.   
  
The earliest written sources on Kievian Rus' describe how it was founded by Vikings (varyagi; 
Thomsen, 1877), and the twelfth-century Chronicle of Nestor sets out how the local Slavic tribes 
invited the Vikings or Varangians to take on the rule of the land in the 860s: 
 
                                                 
    [3] Two kinds of events have decided the periodisation of the chapters. One is war. The other is change 
in the top leadership of the state leading to a change in the state's position. 
            And they went over the sea to the Varangians, to the Rus', for so were these particular 
Varangians called, as others are called Swedes, others Normans, others English and 
Gotlanders. The Chud, the Slavonians, the Krivichi and the Ves said to the Rus': 'Our 
land is large and rich, but there is no order in it. Come and rule and reign over us'. And 
three brothers were chosen with their whole clan, and they took with them all the Rus', 
and they came. 
 
The duality between the land and the ruler employed by this chronicler can be retraced in other 
sources from the same time, notably the twelfth-century Lay of the Host of Igor. For our 
purposes, it is significant that the word Russian is tied to the land (zemlya russkaya), and not 
only to the invited Norman rulers. It is also significant that the Rus’ seem in all likelihood to 
have been invited to put paid to the raiding and trading of these tribes by a steppe polity, the 
Khazars, for if this was indeed the case, we see here the first stirrings of that forced choice 
between political points of orientation, located in the East and to the North-West, that lies at the 
heart of this book (Noonan, 2001). Diplomatic contacts between Kievan Rus’ and monarchs to 
its West reached a zenith during the 11th century, and then receded as Rus’ princes spent more 
and more energy on fighting one another and on contacts with nomadic peoples that emerged 
out of the steppe to their East. In 1238, a detachment of the Mongol Empire arrived to claim 
Rus’ lands. The question of the day was once more whether to look to the North-West for help, 
or whether to collaborate with the invaders from the East (Neumann & Pouliot, 2011). This 
struggle centred on relations within the key kinship line of the day, the Vsevolodskiys, and 
specifically on who should hold what was, after the fall of Kiev, the leading city in the land, 
namely Vladimir. The key contenders were the brothers Aleksandr and Andrey. Given 
Mongolian superior military force, the temptation to embrace the inevitable and collaborate 
must have been very strong indeed. The key bandwagoner was Aleksander Nevskiy. Already 
in the early years of the Mongol invasion, Aleksander had spent the time successfully 
fighting Swedish detachments (1240, earning his moniker) and German Knights (1242). 
When their father died in 1248, Aleksander was next in line of succession, but it was his 
younger brother Andrey who seized the throne and Vladimir. Alexander got what was left of 
Kiev. Andrey was one of the few Rus’ princes to advocate resistance to the Mongols. Since 
Vladimir had been the main prize since the Mongol (or Tatar, to use the Russian 
moniker)  invasion, Aleksander did not rest content with this decision, and in 1252 he went to 
the Horde and obtained their help to oust Andrey. Andrey fled to Sweden. Aleksander had 
managed to put paid not only to his brother Andrey, but to organised opposition to the 
Mongols as such. As Fennell (1983: 108) puts it, 
 
this was the end of any form of organized opposition to the Tatars by the rulers of 
Russia for a long time to come. It was the beginning of Russia’s real subservience to 
the Golden Horde […] the so-called ‘Tatar Yoke’ began not so much with Baty’s [that 
is, the head of the invading Mongols, a.k.a. Batu] invasion of Russia as with 
Aleksander’s betrayal of his brothers. 
 
The Eastern party won over the Western party. Russian ties to polities to its West were not 
severed, however, and took on increasing importance as the Mongol hold on Russian lands 
weakened throughout the fifteenth century.  
 
Throughout Christendom the challenge of the Ottoman Empire was viewed with apprehension. 
A church meeting was called in Ferrara-Florence in 1438-1439, and an attempt made to 
consolidate the forces of all of Christendom. For the Byzantine church, to which the Russian 
church paid allegiance, this involved accepting the primacy of the Roman Pope. In this attempt 
at overcoming the split between Eastern and Western Christendom, the Byzantines had the 
backing of the delegates from Moscow. The Russian Metropolitan Isidor was an active 
participant throughout the meeting. 
 
Having acknowledged the primacy of the Roman Pope, Isidor returned to Moscow, where it 
became immediately apparent that his ecumenical interest clashed with the interests of the state 
as formulated by the Grand Duke of Muscovy. For the Grand Duke, the Russian state-building 
project was to some extent hampered by the existence of the Byzantine Empire. To him, it was 
not obvious that Constantinople should be supported in the name of Christian solidarity, to the 
detriment of state interests (Neumann & Welsh, 1991). Isidor was arrested, and the church union 
to which he had been a party never materialised. 
 
When Constantinople fell under the Ottoman onslaught, there were some Muscovites who 
expressed regret and maintained that Russian support for the Byzantine Empire could perhaps 
have saved the city for Christendom. On the whole, however, they were marginalised by the 
state. The line of the state church was that Constantinople's fall was God's punishment of the 
Greeks for their union with the Roman church, and their acceptance of the Roman Pope. At the 
risk of over-interpreting the data, one can detect an early incidence of debate about Europe here. 
The marginalised minority position may be restated a follows: As part of Christendom, 
Muscovy had a moral responsibility to defend that Christendom in its entirety. By failing to 
contribute to the defence of Constantinople and the Byzantine Empire, Muscovy carried part of 
the responsibility for its downfall. Against this position stood the official one, which rested on 
the premise that Muscovy was not part of one unitary Christendom, but rather wholly distinct 
from Roman Christendom. Furthermore, it was held, Muscovy was in fact the unique 
embodiment of historical truth. Therefore, moral responsibility did not entail Christian 
solidarity. On the contrary, the imperative was for Muscovy to keep its true and only 
Christianity unsoiled by Roman heresies. In short, the official position stressed that Muscovy 
was unique, and morally superior, and that it should therefore keep itself aloof. 
 
Isidor’s participation in the church meeting at Firenze-Ferrara was but one of many cultural 
contacts between Russians within the Khipchak Khanate and Europe. As Marshall Poe 
(2000:12-13) points out: 
 
Despite the lore of a long scholarly tradition, Russia was not ‘discovered’ by Europeans 
in the first quarter of the sixteenth century, when early travellers like Sigismund von 
Herberstein arrived, for there had been continuous contacts between the east Slavs and 
the political entities around the Baltic since the time of the Vikings, and there had also 
been more scattered contacts with the continental powers. 
 
For example, Russia and Denmark formalized diplomatic contacts in 1493. Poe does, however, 
stress how ‘Muscovites knew little or nothing about “refined” European customs before the 
early sixteenth century’ (Poe, 2000: 209-210). Being part of the Khipchak Khanate (or, as it has 
later ben called, the Golden Horde) had left Muscovy with a whole plethora of  practices that 
diverged from European ones. This lent an Eastern flavour to the political life of the Russian 
polity as well as to its European diplomacy (see Vernadsky, 1953: 127-130, 222-223, 333-390; 
Halperin, 1987: 90-95, 149n7; Ostrowski, 1998; Ostrowski, 2000; Halperin, 2000). 
 
In 1486, a noble knight by the name of Nikolai Poppel arrived in Moscow, carrying a letter from 
the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick III. The Holy Roman Empire came to know Muscovy as a 
polity separate from the Polish-Lithuanian state. Upon Poppel’s return to the Empire, he started 
to spread the word about the Russian state and about the riches and power of its ruler. Here is the 
official Soviet diplomatic history’s version of what ensued: 
 
In 1489, Poppel returned to Moscow, now already as the official agent of the Emperor of 
the Holy Roman empire. In a secret audience he suggested to Ivan III that he should 
petition the Emperor to confer upon him the title of king. From the point of view of 
Western European political thought, this would be the only means of legalising a new 
state and to introduce it into the common system of European states – and at the same 
time place it in a certain state of dependence of the empire. But in Moscow, another 
point of view held sway. Ivan III answered Poppel with dignity: “By God’s grace, we are 
the ruler of our land from the beginning, from the first of our ancestors, it has been given 
us by God, and as it was for our ancestors, so it is for us” (Zorin, 1959: 262). 
 
Ivan III then launched a campaign to be treated as the equal of the Holy Roman Emperor 
(Neumann, 2008). The Russians had to do real narrative work and tweaking in order to make 
this insistence on equality possible. In the late 1400s, the Russians were far from certain about 
what to make of their Mongol connection. There was a duality in the Russian knowledge 
production about these relations, which goes to the heart of how Russo-Mongol relations are 
relevant to Russia’s entry into the European state system. On the one hand, as has been 
demonstrated convincingly by Charles Halperin (1985: 8), Russian contemporary sources, both 
the chronicles paid for by princes as well as literary genres such as the byliny (folk songs), 
finessed a technique of not touching on the fact of Mongol suzerainty directly, ‘by presenting 
Russo-Tatar relations as merely a continuation of Kievan relations with the steppe with no 
change of suzerainty involved’.[4] However, once the Mongols seemed to be a spent force, there 
was a need to tell a story about Russia’s history as having some kind of continuity. A solution 
that lay close to hand was to forge a new role for the Russian leader as being not only a great 
prince, but a tsar. The problem was that the term tsar was a translation into Russian not only of 
the Greek term basileus (i.e. Byzantine emperor), but also of khan. The implication of these 
eponymous translations was that these two entities were treated on a par. Note that the fall of 
Constantinople is at this point half a century back (in 1453). There was no longer a basileus in 
Constantinople. The hegemon to live down was the khan in Saray, the capital of the Khipchak 
Khanate (or Golden Horde). Vassilian, bishop of Rostov and a close advisor to Ivan III, came up 
with an answer to this problem, namely to raise the status of Ivan III to that of tsar and so live 
down the very idea that there was ever such a thing as a tsar in Saray. The link should be that of 
basileus to tsar, and the khan should be treated as nothing but an impostor (see Cherniavsky, 
[1959] 1970). And so, faced with a new emperor, this time to his West, Ivan III stayed the 
course of insisting on equality with the top dog.  
 
In 1472, Ivan III married Sofia Paleologue, the niece of Byzantium's last emperor Constantine. 
The marriage immediately gave rise to the idea that Russia was Byzantium's historical 
successor, thereby transferring some of the greatness of the fallen empire onto Russia. In fact, 
the idea was taken even one step further, to assert the doctrine of Moscow as the Third Rome. In 
extant literature, the majority view is that this doctrine was to play a central role in subsequent 
Russian political debate. The crucial move was made by the monk Philotheus (Filofey) in 1520, 
in a letter to the Grand Duke Basil III: 'And now, I say unto thee: take care and take heed, pious 
                                                 
[4] It is in this spirit that the neo-Eurasianist Lev Gumilev, who, as will be discussed below, was an 
important tie between the Russian Eurasianists of the 1920s and the strong neo-Eurasianism of  today, 
argued that there was never and Mongol invasion, but that Russians accommodated Mongols 
voluntarily (Bassin, 2015). 
tsar; all the empires of Christendom are united in thine, the two Romes have fallen and the third 
exists and there will not be a fourth' (Strémooukhoff, 1953: 94).  
 
Recent scholarship has cast doubt on the relevance of the Third Rome thesis in its early 
centuries, and argued that it only came to the fore as a legitimation device in the nineteenth 
century (Poe, 2001; Kalb, 2008). Be that as it may, the doctrine of Moscow as the Third Rome 
did not change the framework within which the West was seen. Neither did it change the moral 
assessment of the embryonic westernisers. The doctrine's explicit statement of the relationship of 
Russia to the West in temporal terms - the idea of Russia as successor - was not matched by a 
statement about spatial relations. In other words, the borders of Moscow the Third Rome, that 
container of God's living church, were not clearly defined. Here, the link between Christian 
imagery and the Russian state-building project can be seen to have an external as well as internal 
dimension. The internal significance of the doctrine is to equate the ruler with divine history on 
earth. The external dimension concerns the relationship to the Other, to the former areas of the 
Roman Empire. This is surely asymmetrical, inasmuch as the Other has been abandoned by God 
in favour of Moscow. 
 
In 1547, the ruler adopted the title of tsar. At the same time, the boyars, the Russian noblemen 
who had until this time been able to sustain themselves as an alternative power centre to the 
ruler, were being divested of their independent status. This development holds a special interest, 
since it was probably the debate of the boyars which gave rise to the next key development in 
Russian political debate. Michael Cherniavsky has suggested that it was the boyar opposition 
which came up with the idea of Holy Russia, and that this idea was part of their counter-
hegemonic thrust, directed at the reigning doctrine of Moscow as the Third Rome. 
 
Relations with Europe were also coloured by imperial expansion to the east. As the annexation 
of the other successor states of the Golden Horde proceeded (Pelenski, 1967; de Hartog, 1995), 
there opened an interesting split in representations of Muscovite rule. Once the domestic work of 
establishing the basic continuation of Russia’s legitimacy as a Christian power was done, 
Muscovy actually started propping up its claims to being an imperial power on a par with the 
Holy Roman Empire by invoking its conquests of the successors states of the Golden Horde, 
notably Kazan’ and Astrakhan. The pride that Russians took in being the key successor of the 
Golden Horde was also evident in the sixteenth century aristocratic fashion for tracing one’s 
ancestry back to Mongols (Halperin, 1985: 113). In a situation where Europeans knew little of 
Mongol or even Asian ways, Russia chose to base its claims for recognition partly on its Mongol 
connection. This is eminently understandable given the formation of Muscovy’s habitus. It is 
also eminently understandable that this habitus put Russia at an enormous disadvantage in its 
attempts at gaining recognition from European powers. 
 
Contacts were also hampered by more specific cultural practices. In a recent debate on the extent 
of Russian cultural borrowing from the Mongols, Halperin (2000: 237), who argued in favor of 
limited borrowing, nonetheless conceded that “[c]ertainly Muscovite diplomatic norms for 
dealing with steppe states and peoples were modelled on Tatar ways”. Ambassadors were met at 
the border of the polity, and then escorted to the capital, with efforts being made en route to keep 
them from seeing the land through which they travelled. Once in the capital, they were kept 
secluded. Compared to that of European diplomats, the Russian approach leaned towards 
secrecy, and this remained an important factor way into the 19th century, when Western 
diplomats posted to St. Petersburg routinely complained about their lack of access to the court. 
Indeed, throughout the Cold War, foreign diplomats were not allowed to move more than 40 
kilometres outside of Moscow without a special permit. Halperin (1985: 92) sums up the 
Muscovy diplomatic experience as follows: 
 
Given the importance of Russia’s relations with its oriental neighbors, it is natural that 
Muscovy drew upon Tatar diplomatic practices in establishing its own. Accordingly, 
Muscovite diplomatic protocol was essentially Asian. Rulers communicated and 
exchanged gifts through envoys who were supported by the host country and allowed to 
engage in tax-free trading to supplement their subsistence. The envoy presented himself 
on his knees and left his weapons outside (a serious problem for sword-bearing Western 
nobles). Negotiations were preceded by lengthy greetings, questions about the journey 
and the rulers’ health, and a ceremonial meal eaten without silverware. Not all the 
elements of the elaborate diplomatic etiquette were uniquely Asian. Still, it was 
sufficiently un-European that in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries Muscovy and the 
Ottomans communicated with a facility neither could achieve in dealings with 
Europeans.  
 
This bred resentment. To take an example from the most widely-read travelogue at the time, the 
German-Slovenian Baron Sigismund von Herberstein ([1551] 1851-52) noted that Russians 
considered non-orthodox Christians to be unclean, which meant that rank-and-file Muscovites 
had a reason to stay away from them, and that the aristocrats which did meet with them and then 
followed the European custom of shaking hands, ritually washed themselves after the encounter. 
As late as the 1660s, when a number of European diplomats, soldiers and merchants had been 
invited to the realm, a key observer talked about their separate quarters as ‘the diseased parts of 
the state and the body politic’, and it was only during this decade that ambassadors were allowed 
to walk the streets of Moscow alone (Krizhanich quoted in Poe 2000: 83). Poe (2000: 41) 
stresses that ‘nonetheless, the Russian authorities realized that diplomacy and mercantile 
relations with European powers were necessary’. For the next two hundred years, which is the 
gestation period for the European states system, Russia was a peripheral presence. Attempts at 
marrying into European dynasties were thwarted by cultural practices such as an unwillingness 
to make paintings of prospective candidates (then as now, an important item of a well-worked-
out contact ad) and insistence on conversion to Orthodoxy. Consider the first overture, in 1642, 
when tsar Mikhail sent a special mission to Denmark to offer the hand of his daughter Irene to 
the son of Christian IV, Prince Waldemar. The instructions given to the envoys in Moscow must 
have seemed more than a little strange in Copenhagen: a customary overture to such 
negotiations, the delivery of a portrait, was to be avoided with the explanation that the taking of 
portraits could be dangerous for the health of Russian princesses, who in any case were to be 
viewed whether in the flesh or in effigy by close relatives only. The possibility of Waldemar 
becoming one of the latter nearly foundered at the beginning over the more serious question of 
his determination to remain a Lutheran, and when he travelled to Moscow on the understanding 
that he would not have to convert to orthodoxy only to find his prospective father-in-law a 
fervent proselytiser, a stalemate ensued which kept the prince under close house arrest (Dukes, 
1990: 13).  
 
There were reasons for the Rusian reticence. At the very end of the sixteenth century, the agnatic 
line that had furnished Russians with rulers since the founding of Kievan Rus’ died out. The 
ensuing succession struggle was a fierce one, and the period has gone down in historiography as 
the Time of Troubles. The Poles took advantage of Russian weakness to occupy Moscow in 
1611. Even in this time of hiatus between two tsarist lineages, the invader from the West was 
still repulsed. Two years later, in 1613, the Zemskiy Sobor elected said Mikhail Tsar, and 
relations between the new ruler and the ruled were intended to be put on a new footing. Whereas 
'Holy Russia' had come into use in the previous century as a counter-hegemonic move to 
conflate the tsar's claim to be at one with the people and the land, the term's significance was 
now successfully altered. 'Holy Russia' came into common use to denote 'the people'. 
Significantly, it soon came to include tsar, state and people. This seems to indicate a conception 
of the state as an extension of the tsar, the little father, married to the Holy Russian motherland. 
A marriage is a metaphor for unity, but of unity between two distinct entities. In this case, the 
two entities are the state and the nation. 
 
The crystallisation of state and nation becomes clear when we examine the role of the liminal 
Don Cossacks, who resided outside the borders of Muscovy. The Cossacks were of orthodox 
faith, and were therefore considered to be Russian. However, the Don Cossacks, some of whom 
were former serfs who had won their freedom by escape and risked being apprehended by their 
former masters, were always anxious to preserve the right to enter Russia safely (Sunderland, 
2004; see also Khodarkovsky, 2004). 'What is interesting', Cherniavsky (1958: 624-625;;) 
comments,  
 
            is that Moscow also saw its boundaries as those of the 'political' Muscovite state and 
ordered the Cossacks not to allow freemen to enter 'Russia and the upper [River] towns'. 
The Moscow government as well as the Cossacks acknowledged implicitly the 
distinction between, or the nonentity of, the Moscovite state and 'Holy Russia'.  
 
The state now made other moves which acknowledged that there was no automatic confluence 
between the abode of the living church (that is people of orthodox faith), and the territory of the 
Russian state as such. 
 
These differing conceptions of the Russian state and the Russian nation around the Time of 
Troubles were intimately linked with different positions on Russia's relations with the West. In 
this regard, attention centred on the Western invader, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. On 
the one hand, a number of people continued to see the Poles and the West in terms of an 
orthodox Christian framework. They were held to be a Western variant of the Tatar Yoke, a 
godless mass of people spiritually inferior to the Russians, with whom one should have a 
minimum of intercourse. Others, however, started to see the Poles and the West in terms of 
another framework. Some Russians saw the question of relations with the Poles less in terms of 
their Roman Christianity and more in terms of their economic and political organisation. Not 
infrequently, written statements were made to the effect that the Poles were superior to the 
Russians in this regard. These embryonic westernisers surmised, therefore, that backward Russia 
had something to learn from the Poles and other Europeans. Those who took up such a position 
were behind an attempt to make Władysław of Poland tsar of all the Russians.  
 
The debate between these two parties is already a fully fledged Russian debate about Europe. As 
noted by the contemporary Ivan Timofeev, differing perceptions of Europe made it impossible 
to forge a common Russian identity. Russians, he wrote, were 'turning their backs to each other. 
Some look to the East, others to the West' (ovii k vostoku zryat, ovii zhe k zapadu) (Zen'kovskiy 
1955). 
 
The view that the West was a place from which one could learn lost ground during the 
seventeenth century, perhaps not least because of the Thirty Years' War. At the end of the 
century, however, it began to pick up again. 'The need to move along a new path was 
acknowledged', the Russian historian S.M. Solov'ev was later to sum up the mood in a famous 
understatement (quoted in Platonov, 1972: 133). With the coming to power of Peter I, the entire 
Russian political debate changed radically, so radically that it is often treated as 'a new 
beginning': 
 
            The whole history of Russian political and social thought can be seen as the history of the 
development of contrasting views of the Petrine Reform, as the history of the attitude of 
various political currents - conservative, liberal, reactionary, revolutionary, reformist, 
Populist, Slavophile, Westerner, Socialist - towards the legacy of Peter the Great 
(Szamuely, 1988: 125; Riasanovsky, 1985). 
 
The importance of Peter's views and exploits for the Russian debate on and relations with 
Europe can hardly be overestimated. First, Russia became a factor of some importance within 
the European states system. The waging of the Thirty Years' War had merged the two partially 
discrete states systems focussed respectively on the Baltic Sea and on the European Continent. It 
was Peter's victory in the Great Northern War, and especially the victory over the Swedes and 
their Ukrainian allies at Poltava in 1709, which made Russia the predominant Baltic power. And 
further, it was because of this predominance that Russia became a factor to be reckoned with in 
the European states system at large (Watson, 1984). It was no coincidence that Peter's window 
on the west, St Petersburg, was situated on the Baltic.  
 
Secondly, Peter's modernisation of Russia from above involved the introduction of a number of 
Western technologies, practices, beliefs and personnel. These changes also affected the language 
of state. The title of the ruler was changed from tsar to imperator. The significance of the 
doctrine of the Third Rome for the ruler was weakened as the capital was moved from Moscow 
to St Petersburg. This slight, but very significant, movement away from seeing the tsar as the 
only possible expression of the state can also be seen in Peter's alteration of the object of military 
devotion from being 'the interests of His Tsarist majesty' to 'the interests of the state' 
(Riasanovsky, 1976: 13). Arguably, given the state of relations between ruler and ruled, Peter's 
innovations in this field had the immediate effect of increasing the distinction between ruler and 
ruled. In addition, the modernisation drive came on top of the state's onslaught against the 
segments of the Orthodox Church which refused to submit to the discipline of the state-church, 
the so-called schismatics (raskol'niki). 
 
The bulk of opposition to Peter's westernising reforms was based on religious views according 
to which Germans, and indeed anyone who wore Western clothes, were heathen, and therefore 
inferior and to be treated accordingly. Nevertheless, Peter was to a large extent able to 
marginalise such views from the public debate (Schafly, 1988). The language of discourse 
changed in the most concrete of ways, as Russian gave way to French as the preferred medium 
for communication among the upper classes. Religiously based opposition to the West was only 
found among merchants, the raskol'niki, and the masses, none of whom took part in official 
political discourse. As Vasiliy Zen'kovskiy ([1929], 1955: 13) of the Orthodox Theological 
Institute in Paris was to comment some two hundred years later: 'The eighteenth century's 
passion for the West makes it fully possibly to say that the Russian soul was indeed taken 
prisoner by the West'.  
 
Throughout the eighteenth century, Russia engaged in what can only be termed 'region-building' 
vis-à-vis Europe (Neumann, 1994a): The Russian state formulated, disseminated and insisted 
upon a geographical definition of Europe as stretching all the way to the Ural Mountains in the 
east, thereby incorporating the most populous parts of Russia. The idea that Europe ends and 
Asia begins at the Urals was first presented by a Russian geographer. Having been charged by 
Peter the Great with the task of drawing up a new geography for his new empire, Vasiliy 
Tatishchev argued in the 1730s that instead of drawing the border along rivers, 'it would be 
much more appropriate and true to the natural configuration' to use the Urals - or the great belt 
(Velikiy poyas) - as the boundary (quoted in Bassin, 1991: 6). 
 
The dogged insistence with which the Russian state - within eighteenth century international 
debate as well as in the domestic debate - repeated that the Urals made up Europe's eastern 
border, and the repeated protestations that Russia was a European power, suggest that this was 
far from obvious to the contemporary observer.[5]  
 
The revolution in France in 1789 utterly changed the setting for the Russian debate about 
Europe. The military challenge to Russia which grew out of the French revolution had a political 
parallel which was no less challenging. Once what was seen as the 'natural' regime type in 
France - enlightened absolutism - was overthrown and so became the ancien régime, the 
question of the ruler's legitimacy was bound to enter the debate in other countries also.  
 
                                                 
    [5] 'Russia is a European power', Catherine the Great announced programmatically in 1766, yet at around 
the same time she admitted in a private letter to Frederick the Great that she was like the raven in the 
fable, which adorned itself with the feathers of the peacock (Wittram, 1973: 61; Anderson 1970; for a 
dissenting view, see Raeff, 1964). The insistence hardly ended with the eighteenth century. When in 
1931, Foreign Minister Litvinov answered an invitation from the League of Nations to participate in the 
deliberations about the Briand Plan for a European Union, he said that 'it is incomprehensible and 
surprising that a group of European States should arrogate to themselves the right to decide on the 
admission or non-admission of another group of European States to a community which claims the title 
of "pan-European"' (reprinted in Degras, 1952: 471). It is, moreover, of direct relevance here that the 
1980s Soviet idea of a 'Common European Home' originated in international - and not in Soviet domestic 
- discourse. The expression was first used by Brezhnev during a 1981 visit to Bonn, cf. Sodaro (1990: 
281). 
